Competition among hospitals is commonly regarded as inefficient due to the medical arms race phenomenon, but most evidence for this hypothesis predates the Medicare prospective payment system and preferred provider legislation. Recent studies indicate hospital competition reduces costs and prices, but nearly all such research has focused on California. We add to the body of literature that analyzes the effects of competition in hospital markets. Using data from the state of Washington, we show that hospitals assume more risk in competitive markets by being more likely to accept prospective payment arrangements with insurers. If the arrangement is retrospective, the hospital is more likely to offer a discount as the number of competing hospitals increases. Both findings indicate that competitive forces operate the same in hospital markets as in most others: as the number of competitors increases, prices decrease and market power shifts from the suppliers to purchasers. The medical arms race hypothesis that favors more concentrated hospital markets no longer appears to be valid.
Some observers have argued that competition in health care markets is inefficient. This belief is not without evidence; researchers such as Robinson and Luft (1985, 1987) have found indications of higher costs in hospitals operating in more competitive markets, which is opposite what one would expect if competitive forces in hospital markets operated in a normal fashion. Arrow (1963) showed that health care markets have several types of uncertainty and informational asymmetries that, taken together, make markets for health care subject to varying degrees of market failure. One such market failure can be competition-induced inefficiencies. As Dranove, Shanley, and Simon (1992) note, research results such as these have been used by courts to allow concentration-increasing hospital mergers that otherwise would be prohibited under antitrust law.
More recent research points to a different conclusion-that competition in hospital markets enhances efficiency through reducing costs and lowering prices. The strongest empirical evidence so far has been found using data from the state of California. Zwanziger and Melnick (1988) found that hospitals in more competitive markets lowered their costs significantly through the early to mid-1980s compared to hospitals in less competitive markets. Separately, Melnick et al. (1992) found that hospital competition affects the relationship between hospitals and insurers. Each can exert market power on the other to influence prices. Insurers with less market power (smaller shares of patients in given markets) receive less favorable pricing from hospitals. At the same time, insurers receive more favorable pricing from hospitals that face more competition from other hospitals.
Why have previous researchers found conflicting results? We believe it can be explained by the underlying structural changes in the health care industry. The early work indicating that competition creates inefficiencies relied on data prior to the 1983 prospective payment change in Medicare reimbursement. The procompetitive results cited in the previous paragraph were developed from data that covered a time when both prospective payment and California state legislation enabled more competitive delivery vehicles. To date, the California results have not been replicated for any other states. The policy importance of this issue should be clear. The conflicting empirical evidence calls for continued analysis to confirm or reject one of these positions.
This paper, which analyzes data from the state of Washington, offers new support for the ''procompetition'' findings that Zwanziger and Melnick uncovered using California data. We chose Washington state because it, too, had passed enabling legislation prior to the period that our data cover. While replicating previous research in a different state is one possible way to validate a hypothesis, we offer new evidence of the effects of competition in health care markets. Beyond lowering prices, competitive pressures might be expected to force hospitals to offer larger discounts for services or to assume a greater degree of risk in treating patients-possibly forcing hospitals to offer flat-rate contracts to insurance companies' enrollees if other hospitals are vying for the same business. This is one facet of hospital/insurer dealing that has not been previously examined. Using proprietary data from one insurer in Washington, we analyzed the effect of competition on risk allocation. The result was consistent with that suggested by the findings from California. The likelihood of hospitals offering discounts or of ac-cepting the risk for patient treatment increased as the degree of competition increased, indicating that competitive forces operate in the manner that normally would be expected.
The current antitrust climate surrounding health care markets increases the importance of thorough empirical work. This paper will start by briefly summarizing some of the prior research, both from California and elsewhere, on the effects of competition in hospital markets. We also present a review of the literature on bargaining that explains how competitive forces affect players. This will be followed by the results found analyzing data from the state of Washington and then by concluding remarks.
Literature Review
As noted earlier, Robinson and Luft (1985, 1987) presented strong evidence of competitioninduced inefficiency in hospital markets. Their 1985 paper used nationwide hospital data from 1972 and 1973, while the 1987 study compared market performance in 1972 with that in 1982. In both cases, they found that lower costs were associated with more concentrated markets. Zwanziger (1987) and Zwanziger and Melnick (1988) found similar results using California data from the early 1980s, but the effects of competition changed following the adoption in 1983 of the Medicare diagnosis-related group (DRG) system. 1 Additionally, 1982 California legislation enabled insurers to form preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and selectively contract with health care providers. Zwanziger and Melnick attributed the change in the effect of competition to the managed care legislation. Robinson and Luft (1988) , following up on their earlier work with later data, found that hospital costs per admission increased 10.1% less in California than in control hospitals in 43 states over the period 1982-1986. They attributed the difference in California to the success of the state's 1982 market-oriented reforms.
The changes in California were so effective because they changed the health care market from being patient-driven to being payer-driven. Prior to the 1980s, most health insurance was based upon retrospective, fee-for-service (FFS) reimbursement. Hospitals competed for physicians, since the physicians-through their referrals-were the source of patients.
In competitive markets, hospitals had an in-centive to have inefficiently high levels of quality to attract physicians. This caused what has been referred to as the ''medical arms race'' to inflate costs in more competitive markets. Dranove, Shanley, and Simon (1992) used 1983 data from California to analyze the distribution of hospitals offering specific services such as cardiology, CT scans, and radiation therapy to test the medical arms race hypothesis. They found some evidence to support this hypothesis for some of the services examined, but market-area population was the most important determining factor (as would be expected in any market with scale economies). To whatever extent the medical arms race inflated costs in more competitive markets, the advent of managed care changed the relationship. With the enabling legislation in California, a large proportion of California's population began to be covered by some form of managed care health insurance. PPOs, health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and point-of-service (POS) plans became an increasingly dominant source of patients. With large numbers of enrollees, they sought discounts or prospective reimbursement arrangements with hospitals. They steered their patients toward the favored providers by offering lower copayments for care obtained there. This effect was greater in more competitive markets because the insurers could contract with alternate hospitals, and the incentive likewise became stronger as the proportion of the market-area population covered by managed care increased. 2 Staten, Dunkelberg, and Umbeck (1988) , analyzing 1984 data from the state of Indiana, found that Blue Cross received greater discounts in markets with multiple hospitals; conversely, monopoly hospitals were less likely to submit a bid to Blue Cross to be a PPO provider (hospital markets were defined by county). Melnick et al. (1992) used data from Blue Cross of California to examine the effect of hospital competition on prices paid by Blue Cross for inpatient care. They found higher levels of competition resulted in lower prices. In addition, prices fell as Blue Cross's market share increased, and hospitals that accounted for a larger share of Blue Cross discharges in a given market area obtained higher prices. Staten, Dunkelberg, and Umbeck (1988) found a similar effect; as Blue Cross of Indiana accounted for a larger share of a hospital's patients, that hospital was more likely to bid to be a PPO and its bid price was higher.
These last two findings are not contradictory. Melnick et al. (1992) used ZIP code-level discharge data to define markets. As Blue Cross accounted for a larger share of discharges from a given hospital's market area, all else equal, prices for services at that hospital fell. However, as a given hospital accounted for a larger share of Blue Cross discharges from the market area-meaning that there were fewer alternate hospitals to which Blue Cross patients went to seek care-prices increased. Both these findings are consistent with what one would expect to find in normally functioning markets. Dranove and White (1994) provide a more detailed exposition of the transition from patient-to provider-driven competition in hospital markets over the last two decades.
Studies analyzing hospital prices and pricecost margins have largely mirrored the literature on costs. Davis (1971) and Chirikos (1989) found that more competition resulted in higher prices. Dranove, Shanley and White (1993) calculated price-cost margins for a collection of hospital services using transaction prices for hospitals in California for 1983 and 1988. They found no relationship between price-cost margins in 1983 but found that increases in competition resulted in lower price-cost margins in 1988. Gruber (1992) confirmed this result for California. Dranove and White (1994) conclude this evidence supports the hypothesis that growth in selective contracting increased the sensitivity of price-cost margins and transaction prices to the level of competition.
One factor that is not consistent in the literature is the method of quantifying the degree of competition. The research cited previously, and research in the field of industrial organization, use a variety of measures for market structure: 1) N, the number of firms; 2) CR n , the n-firm concentration ratio; or 3) HHI, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Robinson and Luft (1985 , 1987 , 1988 and Dranove, Shanley, and Simon (1992) used the first measure, N. Robinson and Luft counted all hospitals within 15 miles of each other to be in the same market, while Dranove, Shanley, and Simon used 10 miles as the limit. However, Dranove, Shanley, and Simon also considered all hospitals within the same metropolitan area to be in the same market, even if some were separated by more than 10 miles. Zwanziger (1987) , Zwanziger and Melnick (1988) , and Melnick et al. (1992) used a ZIP code-based HHI to measure competition.
In our case, we were particularly interested in the impact of competition on bargaining outcomes. The literature on bargaining and negotiation is much like the literature on auctions in that it uses N, the number of firms involved in the bidding/bargaining/negotiating as the proper measure of competition, not the relative size of the bidding parties. 3 We therefore used N as our measure of competition, and adopted the methods of Dranove, Shanley, and Simon (1992) for calculating the number of firms. We counted all hospitals in the same metro area or within 10 miles of each other as part of the same market.
Despite different estimates of the effects of competition, the literature is largely consistent when taking into account the changing nature of health care markets over the last 25 years. In particular, hospital markets of the 1970s and early 1980s showed evidence of market failure. Competition among hospitals did not produce the same results as would be expected in normally functioning markets. Since then, competitive forces have begun to work well as managed care and prospective reimbursement have become prevalent. However, with the notable exception of the Staten, Dunkelberg, and Umbeck (1988) paper, all previous results have used the California experience. We examine this issue using data from a different state, Washington, and we look at another facet of competition: the issue of risk shifting in competitive environments.
Evidence from Washington
The previous section reviewed the existing body of evidence on the effect of competition in hospital markets. Most of the research completed previously has analyzed the effect of competition on costs and prices. However, competition could force changes in other ways. In this section, we present a model of the effect of competition on bargaining between hospitals and health insurance providers and test the model using data on pricing arrangements between hospitals and an individual Washington insurer. Our hypothesis is that increased competition among hospitals will force them to offer greater discounts or to accept more risk, because their market power declines as the number of alternates available to the insurer increases.
The data were not complete enough to enable a replication of the previous research using average prices paid by insurer as a dependent variable. However, it was possible to model the contracts negotiated by the insurer as a function of competition, patient demographics, and market characteristics.
Contract Formation and the Estimation Problem
From the insurer's perspective, the best kind of contract is some form of prospective payment system in which the hospital assumes some or all of the risk in insuring the patients. Less attractive to insurers is retrospective (FFS) reimbursement. With FFS reimbursement, the hospital assumes none of the risk in the transaction. In normally functioning markets, competition among suppliers drives price downward toward marginal cost, simply because if one firm is unwilling to lower price to marginal cost, a competitor can and will do so. The same type of dynamic can influence the assumption of risk when the nature of the transaction involves significant risk, as it does for hospital care and services. A monopolist hospital has little incentive to assume any risk in treating a patient. The hospital holds most of the market power in the transaction between it and the insurer. That power erodes in markets where an alternate hospital is available, and the erosion continues as the number of alternate hospitals increases. The willingness to assume risk should parallel qualitatively the willingness to cut price.
We therefore would expect to find that insurers are more likely to be able to negotiate prospective arrangements in competitive hospital markets and more likely to have to accept FFS contracts in hospital markets with little competition. It is postulated that the form of reimbursement can be modeled as:
where Type ϭ 1 if insurer has a prospective arrangement with the hospital, 0 otherwise;
C ϭ hospitals' cost of providing care and services; M ϭ market characteristics (e.g., number of hospitals, location); D ϭ patient characteristics (e.g., case mix and payer); and X ϭ hospital characteristics (such as number of beds and ownership).
It is also true that price and cost are a function of these same characteristics. Most notably, both price and cost are a function of Type. In analyzing price, Melnick et. al. (1992) lagged the costs by one year, partially to attempt to eliminate the simultaneity inherent in a price-cost estimation system. While current-year costs may be a function of current prices, previous-year costs may, as a general rule, be taken to be exogenous. Beyond that, however, lagging costs was justified on a theoretical basis because, to the extent that prices are prospectively determined, past costs are more relevant than current ones. This reasoning is relevant for the present analysis of reimbursement type, since past costs will guide hospitals in determining whether to offer prospective terms to insurers. Even with the lag, Melnick et al. found error term correlation and estimated their system with two-stage least squares, using an instrumental variable for cost.
We face a similar dilemma in that the endogeneity of the cost variable could lead to simultaneity bias. This problem can be addressed one of two ways: either a two-stage least squares procedure can be used, or a reduced form equation can be utilized to estimate Type. For reasons that will be elaborated upon in the following discussion regarding the data available to us, we chose as our primary estimation methodology the latter course and used a reduced form equation. Because we postulate that current-year Type is a function of prior-year cost (and because many variables, such as case-mix index and the number of beds, are strongly correlated between years), the reduced form regression includes only 1994 variables to estimate 1995 Type. 4 It is also possible to postulate qualitatively that the same type of relationship between retrospective and prospective reimbursement might exist between full-price FFS and discounted FFS. As the degree of competition among hos-pitals increases, the likelihood of a hospital giving a discount to an insurer would increase as well. More generally, Type could be expanded to include three outcomes: full-price FFS, discounted FFS, and prospective reimbursement. These could be expected to follow one another in progression as hospital competition increased. However, it would not necessarily be true that the difference between full-price FFS and discounted FFS would be the same as that between discounted FFS and prospective reimbursement. The Type variable could not be truly quantitative. This can be estimated most efficiently using an ordered probit model (Kennedy 1998) . We followed this procedure to estimate Type, expanded to three outcomes as described subsequently.
Data
The hospital data used in these estimations came from the Washington State Department of Health. Provided were summary data from each hospital's financial report, including information on hospital costs, revenue, case mix, and the number of patient discharges. These reports are filed each year with the state and we had access to years 1994 and 1995. In addition, one insurer provided data on the nature of its contractual arrangement, if any, with every hospital in the state for 1995. Table 1 provides a complete listing of the data used in this study. The data came from 83 hospitals. Military, Veterans' Administration, psychiatric, alcohol treatment, and rehabilitation hospitals were excluded from our sample, and incomplete data forced us to eliminate several others from the total of 93 hospitals that reported data to the Department of Health in 1995.
Cost. Cost can influence a hospital's willingness to accept a prospective payment arrangement. All else being equal, a lower-cost hospital would be expected to be more willing to assume the risk of treating patients because its pricecost margin would be higher. The likelihood of incurring a loss in treating unexpectedly costly patients therefore would be less. However, accurately determining an appropriate cost measure is not possible given the data available. Hospitals report their gross costs to the state; however, these are not separated for inpatients and outpatients. As Zwanziger (1987) noted, any such separation would be subject to some degree of arbitrary apportionment between inpatients and outpatients even if it were available. A measure of inpatient to outpatient revenue could be used to adjust per diem costs; better would be a variable to control for the number of outpatient visits. Hospitals in the state of Washington report outpatient visits, but such reporting is voluntary (in contrast to inpatient reporting, which is mandatory). Many fail to report outpatient visits, making it impossible to use this variable to estimate cost. The revenue ratio is not fully satisfactory because it is itself an endogenous measure. Because of this, there is no fully satisfactory way to incorporate cost directly in the estimation. Even if a cost variable could be found, the data do not offer satisfactory variables to identify an instrumental variable regression, so we would not be able to generate a good instrument for cost. Any variables from our data that may be postulated to have explanatory power for the cost equation are also relevant for the Type equation. Given these problems, we elected to use a reducedform equation to estimate Type, which elimi-nates the need to consider cost directly for our primary analysis. However, given the limitations of reduced-form estimations, we also estimated the model using the best cost measure available to us. We computed an imperfect measure of per diem cost by dividing total hospital costs by inpatient days. This was included primarily to check the robustness of our findings. Despite the problem of simultaneity, the bias so introduced is often minimal, and regression methods that do not account for it can yield good results (Kennedy 1998) .
Market characteristics. The primary variable for market characteristics is one to control for the extent of competition in the market. As discussed in the previous section, our measure of competition was the number of hospitals within 10 miles or within the same urban area. The only part of Washington where the urban area classification was important was the Seattle-Tacoma metropolitan area. In all other cases, hospitals within the same urban area were also within 10 miles of each other.
A dummy variable for urban hospitals (vs. ru-ral) also was created. Hospitals were designated as urban if they were in one of the Census Bureau-defined Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). Hospitals in the Seattle metro area, Olympia, Spokane, Bellingham, or Vancouver (a Portland, Ore., suburb) therefore were classified as urban. Melnick et al. (1992) included a variable to control for the proportion of discharges in each ZIP code-based market that were covered by Blue Cross, but the Washington data set lacked payer-specific data for individual patients. Melnick et al. (1992) also controlled for the proportion of market-area California Blue Cross discharges accounted for by each hospital, but again the data were not available to attempt this.
Patient characteristics. The patient demographic measures included a case-mix index, which is a DRG-based measure. More serious (and costly to treat) medical conditions are assigned higher case-mix numbers. Hospitals report an overall case-mix figure based upon the DRG codes assigned to patients treated over the course of the year. Case mix has been identified as a statistically significant factor influencing costs (Watts and Klastorin 1980) . The proportions of hospital patient revenue accounted for by Medicare and Medicaid were controlled for as well.
Hospital characteristics. For hospital characteristics, we included the number of beds, the occupancy rate (computed by dividing total patient days across all payer classes by the number of available beds multiplied by 365), and two dummy variables to control for ownership: one for nonprofit hospitals and another for government-owned hospitals. The default condition was non-government proprietary (for-profit). Another dummy variable took a value of one for major teaching hospitals, zero otherwise.
Type. The data on reimbursement type were provided by a health insurance firm that served every area of the state. Some type of prospective contract existed with 34 hospitals. The insurer had a discounted FFS arrangement with 22 others, and no arrangement at all with the other 27 (meaning the insurance company would be billed retrospectively at full price). From these data we generated a dummy variable equal to one if the insurer had a prospective contract with the hospital and zero if it was retrospective. We also generated another variable taking a val-ue of zero if there was no arrangement, one if there was a FFS discount, and two if there was a prospective arrangement. This variable was used in an ordered probit regression as described previously. Similar to the bivariate probit, ordered probit is used for polychotomous qualitative variables; the numeric values serve only to differentiate non-numeric outcomes. Under our hypothesis, the coefficient for the number of competing hospitals should be positive in both regressions since the variables are both coded so that the outcome most favorable to the insurer is the highest in value. The descriptive statistics are in Table 1 .
Estimation Results
The estimation results for the binary probit model of prospective arrangement Type regression are in Table 2 . The two regressions shown are identical except that the second one includes the cost variable. All continuous variables are in natural logarithm form.
The coefficient for the variable controlling for the number of competing hospitals has the expected sign and is statistically significant. The only other variable that is significant at p Ͻ .05 is the revenue proportion from Medicaid.
The results from the ordered probit model of reimbursement contract type are in Table 3 , estimated with and without a separate cost variable. As in the binary probit regression, all continuous variables are in natural logarithm form. The coefficient for the number of competing hospitals is positive and significant in the first regression, and has a p-value of .052 in the second regression. The coefficients for the revenue proportions attributable to Medicare and Medicaid are also significant at p Ͻ .05.
Despite the generally poor quality of the estimated models, their predictive power is good. The Type regression (Table 2) correctly predicts the type of reimbursement for 61 of the 83 hospitals (73%). As Kennedy (1998) notes, this is not always a reliable goodness-of-fit measure; in some cases naïve predictors could be correct all or most of the time. However, it is of more use when the dependent variable is distributed fairly evenly, as it is in this case; a measure less vulnerable to bias is the fraction of zeros correctly predicted plus the fraction of ones correct. This yields a score of 1.42 (42 of 49 with no prospective arrangement were predicted correct- ly and 19 of 34 with prospective arrangement were predicted correctly). The ordered probit regression correctly predicts the reimbursement type for 37 of the 83 hospitals (45% correct overall; 18 of 27 with no arrangement, 0 of 22 with discounted FFS, and 19 of 34 with prospective arrangement). 5
The coefficient for the number of competing hospitals in both regressions signifies that the insurer obtains more favorable terms from hospitals as the number of competing hospitals increases. The estimations also suggest that the magnitude of the increase in the likelihood of receiving favorable terms is most dramatic when the number of hospitals in the market is small; for example, in the first model (Table 2) , an increase in the number of hospitals in the market from one to two would be predicted to increase the probability of prospective contracting by .11 (from .24 to .35) , and an increase from two to three hospitals would increase the probability by another .07, holding all other variables at their mean values. However, increasing the number of competing hospitals from 22 to 23, as would be the case if an additional hospital opened in the Seattle area, would increase the expected probability of prospective reimbursement by less than .01, ceteris paribus. The ordered probit model shows a similar effect-that the impact of adding a hospital to a market is greatest when the existing number of hospitals is small. An increase from one hospital to two would decrease the expected probability of full-price FFS by .10 (from .41 to .31); increase the expected probability of discounted FFS modestly by .006 (from .330 to .336); and increase the expected probability of prospective payment by .095 (from .260 to .355). Increasing the number of hospitals from 22 to 23 would decrease the expected likelihood of full-price FFS by less than .01 (to .07), have a smaller negative effect on the likelihood of discounted FFS (to .21), and increase the expected probability of prospective payment by approximately .01 (to .72).
Conclusion
It is an understatement, but nonetheless true, that the health care industry in the United States is being transformed, both through market forces and government policies. One question-how to correct perceived market failure in the hospital industry-is the focus of the empirical analyses in this paper. If the previously re-searched perverse effect of competition among hospitals-higher prices-can be shown to be no longer valid, then the policy implications are obvious. Any policies that affect hospital markets should enhance, rather than diminish, the degree of competition among hospitals, and will yield the same benefits seen in other markets.
Recent evidence suggests that hospital industry reforms begun in the 1980s have enabled competitive forces to work. The only empirical analysis to date has come from the state of California. There it has been shown that the switch from retrospective to prospective reimbursement and the advent of managed care have worked to reduce prices in markets where competition exists among hospitals.
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the degree of competition affects the nature of the relationship between health insurers and hospitals. Hospitals that face more competition are more likely to offer discounts to insurers; but more significantly, these hospitals are more likely to assume a greater degree of risk in treating an insurer's patients. This result is notable, as it indicates a profound shift in the institutional characteristics of health care markets. This change in the nature of risk bearing could very well prove to have much more impact than the observed price reductions brought on by competition.
The changes that have occurred in the health care market in the last 20 years have helped competitive forces work. Hospitals that must compete with each other now do so by offering lower prices and more favorable terms to insurers. Fifteen or more years ago, the medical arms race may have characterized markets and driven up hospitals' prices in competitive markets. Today, however, it no longer offers a compelling argument for granting antitrust exemptions for hospital mergers.
Notes 1 The DRG system was implemented by the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA) to control the increase in cost of the Medicare system. HCFA established 473 DRGs to identify the diagnosis of any patient admission to the hospital (see Kasten 1987) . Reimbursement was determined by DRG, not by costs incurred in treatment. This gave hospitals an incentive to treat patients as cheaply as possible. An international diagnostic standard that is also used widely in the United States is the International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision (ICD-9 CM) (Baierschmidt et al. 1996) . 2 Managed care coverage (HMOs, PPOs, and POSs) has increased steadily since the early 1980s. In 1994, 66% of workers covered by employer-provided insurance were in some form of managed care plan-see Jensen et al. (1997) , and Sheils and Alecxih (1996) . Since then, the proportion of workers covered by managed care has continued to increase; in 1999, 91% of covered workers in the United States were in an HMO, PPO, or POS (Schauffler et al. 2000) . In California, where managed care penetration has historically been higher, the figure was 96%. 3 The theoretical justification for focusing on N rather than some measure of concentration when examining bargaining models can be found in Bester (1993) . Ericson and Pakes (1995) provide a model that allows for heterogeneity across firms, as well as firm-specific shocks. This paper indicates that the number of firms, rather than some aggregate market share calculation, is a crucial indicator of competitive outcomes. A number of studies has focused on the critical role that the number of firms plays, rather than the market share, in market outcomes. Roth (1991) , for example, discusses this; see also Bulow and Roberts (1989) , Wolinsky (1988) and McAfee and McMillan (1987) . Indeed, the union bargaining literature has used N as the key empirical measure of market structure for some time (see, for example, Dowrick 1989) .
4 We did estimate, however, the models using both 1994 and 1995 variables. The overall quality of the regressions was worse due to the multicollinearity, but the key variable of interest-the number of competing hospitals-was not significantly different, either in magnitude or significance level. These additional regression results are available from the authors upon request. 5 The failure of the ordered probit to predict correctly any of the hospitals with discounted FFS indicates a weakness of the model; however, the fit is not as bad as it may appear. Of the 22 hospitals with discounted FFS, 14 are in one-hospital markets, and another four hospitals are in two-hospital markets. Because there are 46 one-hospital markets, the actual probability of discounted FFS, given that it is a one-hospital market, is 14/46, or .30. The predicted probability is .33 (when all other exogenous variables are equal to their mean values). The actual probability of discounted FFS for a hospital, given a two-hospital market, is 4/8, or .5. The predicted probability is .336.
